Water Scarcity and Conflict

Water scarcity is a significant problem within Africa with around one third of the population living in ‘water-scarce’ conditions. An increasing population fosters greater demand for water for consumption and agriculture (Falkenmark, 1990). Thus, combined with declining rainfall due to climate change, the problem of water scarcity is worsening (ibid). In this context, there has been a growing scholarship attempting to understand how water scarcity can incite conflict. In this blog post I will analyse the contemporary discourses around the scarcity-conflict relationship and delve beyond populist news headlines suggesting water will be at the heart of future conflicts.

Popular Discourses of conflict

Within the media and amongst policy circles there is a strong dialogue around water that points whole-heartedly towards conflict. These concerns that increasing water scarcity will incite wars have been apparent for sometime, for examplethe BBC (1999) claimed ‘the main conflicts in Africa over the next 25 years will likely be over water’ as ‘one in two African countries will face water scarcity in the next 25 years’. However a report into the causes of conflict in Africa suggests borders, ethnicity, military and political as the main reasons for violence, despite references to ‘resources’ water was not once explicitly mentioned (GSDRC, 2011). In spite of this, popular discourses still offer apocalyptic predictions of water resource violence on the continent exemplified by a Guardian article (Goldenberg, 2014). This article suggests that reservoir loss, combined with increased water use in watering crops, cooling power plants and quenching cities’ thirst has increased tensions over water. It further argues that ‘water in shared basins will be used as leverage in confrontations’. The Pacific Institute also cited a fourfold increase in violent confrontations over water in the last decade due to increased competition, bad management and climate change (Pacific Institute, 2016). Thus it is clear that news sources hold a pessimistic viewpoint of how increasing scarcity will foster violent conflict. However political leaders also share similar fears with Prince Hassan of Jordan claiming ‘a war over water could be even bloodier than the Arab Spring (Goldenberg, 2014). I feel that the discourses around water scarcity constructed by world leaders, academics and the media all forward a very pessimistic ‘doomsday’ view of Africa’s ability to manage water resources.

Source - http://www.chrismadden.co.uk/inkline-press/beast/Dam-gun520.jpg 

Conflict

Bearing in mind the populist ideas around water scarcity, it is pertinent to investigate some specific examples and studies to provide a factual basis to judge how scarcity may influence conflicts. Nina Von Uexkull’s (2014) study utilises high-resolution data to argue that sustained drought is associated with an increased risk of civil conflict. Arguably, previous studies on drought and conflict haven’t taken into account local vulnerabilities enough. She suggests that areas relying on rain-fed agriculture are far more likely to see civil conflicts, partaking in rebellions to redress economic grievances and obtain food and incomes. Thus, with 95% of agriculture being rain-fed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Giordano, 2006), vast swathes of the continent are at risk of violent conflict as water scarcity worsens. This is exemplified by a conflict in Kiboya, Kenya between herders and farmers. Longer dry seasons and uncertain rains have put significant pressure on farmers, made worse by pastoralists who have begun migrating their livestock onto farmland due to these droughts. Thus tensions have risen between pastoralists and farmers who both compete for smaller areas of productive land. This has resulted in pastoralist’s cattle eating farmers crops wiping out their profitability. Furthermore some pastoralists have began carrying guns creating fears for farmers who wish to confront them (Langat, 2015). Evidently, the increasing water scarcity in the region has created conflicts between these two groups and generates an atmosphere where violence could easily break out as their livelihoods lie on the line. The land in this area was once communally owned, however the government has sold around 50% to ranchers, therefore this tussle for land rights has heightened tensions. This highlights that there are a myriad of political factors causing conflicts and water scarcity alone isn’t a deciding factor. This is corroborated by Von Uexkull et al’s further 2016 study, which clarifies the scarcity-conflict relationship highlighting, that the most affected are agriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups in very poor countries. Perhaps conflicts over water can be mitigated by improving factors such as poverty, exclusion or poor resource management (Ohlsson, 2000).

Water Scarcity in the Horn of Africa
Source - https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/water_distribution_in_horn_of_africa.jpg

Alternatives to Conflict

However Conflict isn’t always the first answer to water scarcity, the following examples emphasize that populist and dystopian views aren’t always founded and may in fact play up to the hegemonic and damaging stereotypes of ‘Africa’ as a war-torn continent.

Domestically

Relating back to the farmer-pastoralist conflict, the establishment of resource forums in Tanzania brings together herders and farmers to discuss and share water resources peacefully. In Ikolongo village, Tanzania, clashes between farmers and pastoralists led to one death and many injuries, in light of this the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum was created to build understanding around the needs and motivations of different stakeholders (Makoye, 2016). The facilitation of meetings has allowed for agreements on where cattle can drink without impacting farmer’s water resources, furthermore it has led to farmers giving rice husks for cattle to feed on reducing waste. In return, pastoralists provide a donation to local governments to build primary school classrooms; this example highlights how cooperation not only stops conflicts it also provides many spill over benefits to the local community. Mahoo, a local professor of agricultural engineering, states that ‘partnerships like these are essential to coming up with solid solutions to water clashes’ (ibid).

A further example of reducing conflicts is provided by appropriate technology Solar Powered Wells in Kenya. These stop people having to utilise neighbouring community water resources in scarce times, reducing the tensions this creates. Furthermore the creation of these wells have allowed for pastoralists to settle rather than migrating to provide water for cattle, in turn this has improved school attendance levels, once again highlighting the knock-on effects of combatting water scarcity conflicts (Langat, 2016). However these examples highlight the need for strong institutions and communities in order to foster cooperation. I hope that many communities can implement these management schemes in the future.

Internationally

This blog has mainly dealt with small scale, civil conflicts over water resources as previous blogs have focused on international conflicts within the Nile River Basin, however I will provide a small analysis. Within the International realm, apocalyptic discourses make very appealing news stories, in spite of this Kipping and Lindemann (2004) suggest that it is always easier and financially beneficial to avoid conflicts. This is exemplified by a wealth of International Agreements over transboundary water resources in Africa such as the Zambezi Commission, or Nile River Basin Initiative. Whilst there are certainly tensions between these countries they have yet to lead to genuine military conflicts. For example within the Nile Basin, rather than go to war with Ethiopia, Egypt has slowly begun to cooperate and negotiate. Being a downstream riparian, they realise that the way to ensure the most beneficial share of water is to cooperate with upstream riparians such as Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Salman, 2013).

Conclusions

It is evident that pressures over water are clearly increasing in Africa, caused by increasing populations and reducing rainfall patterns just to name a few factors. However I feel that conflicts are certainly overhyped as discourses of ‘water wars’ and ‘bloody conflicts’ make for good news reports. The examples I have provided highlight that it is always more productive to cooperate, both domestically and internationally. However it is pertinent that African countries invest in institutions that foster cooperation and peaceful resolutions, as water scarcity is likely to get far worse in the future.

List of References

BBC (1999) Africa’s potential water wars. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/454926.stm  

Falkenmark, M. (1990) ‘Rapid population growth and water scarcity: The predicament of tomorrow’s Africa’, Population and Development Review, 16, p. 81.

Giordano, M. (2006) ‘Agricultural groundwater use and rural livelihoods in sub-saharan Africa: A first-cut assessment’, Hydrogeology Journal, 14.

Goldenberg, S. (2014) Why global water shortages pose threat of terror and war. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/feb/09/global-water-shortages-threat-terror-war (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

GSDRC (2001) Causes of conflict in Africa. Available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/causes-of-conflict-in-africa/ (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

Langat, A. (2016) Solar-powered wells ease conflict over water in Kenya’s rift valley. Available at: http://news.trust.org/item/20160211101256-7228s/?source=spotlight (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

Langat, W. (2015) As water falls short, conflict between herders and farmers sharpens. Available at: http://news.trust.org/item/20151123073426-fqt5n/?source=spotlight (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

Lindemann, S. and Kipping, M. (2004) ‘Konflikte und Kooperation um Wasser’  Münster: LIT Verlag.  

Makoye, K. (2016) Straight talking calms rural water conflicts in Tanzania. Available at: http://news.trust.org/item/20160303102838-e0jr1/?source=spotlight (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

OhIsson, L. (2000) ‘Water conflicts and social resource scarcity’, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Part B: Hydrology, Oceans and Atmosphere, 25(3), pp. 213–220.

Pacific Institute (2016) Water and conflict - pacific institute. Available at: http://pacinst.org/issues/water-and-conflict/ (Accessed: 23 December 2016).

Salman, M.A. (2013) ‘The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement: A peacefully unfolding African spring?’, Water International, 38(1), pp. 17–29.

Von Uexkull, N. (2014) ‘Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Political Geography, 43, pp. 16–26.

Von Uexkull, N., Croicu, M., Fjelde, H. and Buhaug, H. (2016) ‘Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(44), pp. 12391–12396.

War of the Roses - Investigating the water and politics of the Kenyan cut flower industry

Lake Naivasha is a lake in the south-west of Kenya, close to Nairobi, and is home to Kenya’s booming cut-flower business. The industry has grown hugely in the last 40 years and now makes up 7% of Kenya’s exports, providing jobs for 25,000 employees (Mekonnen et al, 2012). However the rapid increase in both large-scale flower production and the resultant population increase have created significant water management issues in the area. Lake levels have declined, water quality deteriorated and biodiversity is threatened; the lake has shrunk to 75% of its original size since 1982 (Vidal, 2007).

Greenhouses for flower farms on Lake Naivasha, Kenya.

Issues Created

The growth in cut-flower production has prompted greater water use in the Lake Naivasha area; around 20,000 cubic metres of water per day (Vidal, 2007). In particular, non-accredited farms use large amounts of water and it has been suggested that there is the potential of losing the lake within 10-15 years if current water use trends continue (Leipold and Morgante, 2013). In addition the booming flower industry has led to an increase in population around the lake of 300,000 people in the last 30 years (Vidal, 2007). Thus significant threats to the local ecosystem have ensued such as land degradation due to excess farming, deforestation for firewood and soil erosion. In addition, the increase in flower farms has restricted access for nomadic Massai tribes to provide for their cattle, concurrently demand for meat is increasing leading to further need for cattle feed and land degradation. Thus a vicious cycle is created by increase demands for water and food alongside decreased capabilities to meet them. In addition to this the biodiversity around the lake has been harmed seeing a decline in fishing industry as Naivasha become polluted with harmful pesticides and chemicals.

Lake Naivasha is famed as a wetlands area and historically had a great tourism trade, however as bird populations are affected by the cut flower industry, so bird watching is in ‘terminal decline’ creating revenue losses for the local area (Food and Water Watch, 2006). Furthermore unregulated farms are being set up on protected wetland habitats (Leipold and Morgante, 2013), further endangering the biodiversity and natural beauty of this area.

The issues faced in Lake Naivasha highlight the integrated nature of water and ecosystems; nature clearly lies in a balance that has been hugely disturbed by large-scale, intrusive cut-flower farming operations.

Benefits?

However, whilst it is easy to focus on criticising the cut flower industry, it provides vital employment and income for Kenya, a country on the cusp of economic development. The industry employs 25,000 farmers around Lake Naivasha with around 175,000 more indirectly employed. Furthermore some companies provide free medical services and schools helping to improve social development in the local area (Mekonnen et al, 2012). Although there are reports that private medical services provided by companies aim to hide the diseases caused by chemicals to employees (Leipold and Morgante, 2013).

The cut flower industry at Lake Naivasha also generates a debate around ‘fair trade’, it is argued that many companies accredited with fair trade are engaging in unethical practices. Many companies that claim to be ‘fair trade’ are paying workers too low, polluting water with pesticides or other detrimental practices (ARB, 2007). Companies such as Oserian have been cited to engage in unfair fair-trade, advertising their flowers in consumer markets as ‘fairly grown’ and ‘environmentally sustainable’ despite being not so. Thus this highlights that Lake Naivasha isn’t just an issue of water management but also one of rights, fairness and global representations of trade.

The solution?

Now that I’ve highlighted a whole host of issues created by the cut-flower industry around Lake Naivasha, its pertinent to consider the best way to minimise the impacts on the water system and environment.

One method that has been successful is accreditation of farms and the utilisation of local watchdog bodies. Industry accreditation bodies provide certification to arms that engage in responsible farming practices such as using less water or less pesticides. This transfers to the consumer-side in which it is expected that buyers of flowers will prefer to buy from approved and accredited growing companies (Leipold and Morgante, 2013). Furthermore by instilling good practice in accredited farms, it is hoped that these practices will spill-over to become industry norms amongst all farms. Watchdog bodies also assist in reducing the environmental impact of the business, such as the Lake Naivasha Riparian Association, which aims to regulate water used by each farm (Leipold and Morgante, 2013) and create fair and responsible allocations of water. In addition accreditation agencies such as fair trade labelling encourage the preservation of natural habitats by planting trees etc. and thus limit the destruction of biodiversity.

An idea that can be used alongside accreditation is adding a water sustainability premium at the retail end of the supply chains. Increasing the cost of cut flowers to buy for example in the UK will add a ‘sustainability premium’ ensuring that consumers pay a price that coverts the full environmental cost of production (Mekonnen et al, (2012). Whilst it may be presumed that this will reduce demand for flowers, the ethical consumption market is growing in the global north and accreditation agencies such as fair trade can tap into this by educating consumers and providing finances to reduce the ecological footprint of cut flowers.

NGO’s investigations and reports into the issue of cut flowers in the Lake Naivasha area have been vital in uncovering environmental and issues such as overuse of water, pollution of the lake such as the Ethical Trading Initative’s 2005 report.

However there are fears that stricter rules for cut-flower farms could lead to a movement of firms to neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia. Five major flower companies have already moved there following incentives such as 10 year tax holidays and duty-free import of capital goods (ARB, 2007). Thus it begs the question, will Kenya prioritise its economic development or its environment, or can it strike a balance of the two? The current trends are certainly not sustainable and thus it is in the interests of flower companies to improve their relationship with the environment and reduce their water usage.

Roses being sold

List of references

ARB (2007) Flowers: Kenya. Af Res Bull 43(11):17197A–17198A

Becht R, Harper DM (2002) Towards an understanding of human impact upon the hydrology of Lake Naivasha, Kenya. Hydrobiologia 488:1–11

Food and Water Watch (2006) Lake Naivasha Report. Available at: http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/NaivashaReport.pdf (Accessed: 26 November 2016).

Leipold, B. and Morgante, F. (2013) ‘International public policy review the impact of the flower industry on Kenya’s sustainable development’, International Public Policy Review, 7(2).

Mekonnen, M.M., Hoekstra, A.Y. and Becht, R. (2012) ‘Mitigating the water footprint of export cut flowers from the lake Naivasha basin, Kenya’, Water Resources Management, 26(13), pp. 3725–3742 .

Vidal, J. (2007) Drained of life. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/feb/14/kenya.conservation (Accessed: 26 November 2016).

The Akosombo Dam as a Political Symbol

‘The Akosombo Dam across the Volta River in Ghana remains at the center of debates and imaginations about nationhood, modernity, and development’ (Miescher, 2014)

There are a myriad of complex reasons behind the construction of water management systems and this blog post will focus on the utilisation of Dams as a political statement. I will explore the Akosombo Dam in Ghana and the political symbolisms and personality politics involved with its creation.

Background and context

The plans for the Akosombo Dam were formulated in 1915 during British colonial rule, however financing issues meant it wasn’t until Ghana’s Independence that the project began (Miescher, 2014). It was eventually opened in 1965 providing 912 megawatts of power to Ghana, 80% of which went to US–owned Volta Aluminium Company for Aluminium smelting (GhanaWeb, 1994). With Ghana gaining independence in 1957, the Akosombo Dam is central to post-colonial era politics and Kwame Nkrumah’s, the then president, dream of a united Africa. Thus the Akosombo Dam represents power in dual senses of the world; Nkrumah’s power to consolidate his presidency and Ghana’s success, as well as electrical power needed to develop industry within Ghana. This article will discuss the politics and motivations behind the construction of the dam, both domestic and international, set in the context of post-colonialism and African aspirations.

 

Map of Ghana highlighting the Akosombo Dam and subsequent creation of Lake Volta
(Cool Geography, 2014)

Domestic Politics

The ‘Volta River Project straddles the colonial and postcolonial divide’ (Miescher, 2014).  and was poignant in the establishment of Ghana as a postcolonial, independent nation. The era of the 1950’s and 60’s saw the rise of modernisation theory discourse; the view that ‘traditional’ countries can develop following a western model of industrialisation for example Rostow’s Model of growth. Thus, the Akosombo dam was viewed as critically important in Ghana’s industrial development, providing power for industries such as aluminium smelting and manufacturing (Miescher, 2014). Furthermore the Volta River Project held great symbolism as a ‘place of pilgrimage in a modern age of science and technology’ and a ‘monument to the determination to reach a fuller and richer life’ (Nkrumah, 1963). Thus developmentalist discourse of this era, combined with Ghana’s aspirations to be self-sufficient and independent, emphasize the significance of the Akosombo Dam not just as a pathway to industrialisation but also as a symbol of Ghana’s independence and modernity.

The Akosombo Dam also signifies the importance of personality politics within water management schemes. The building of the dam was central to Nkrumah’s dream of creating a modern and unified Africa built on industrialisation leading to the dam being colloquially known as ‘Nkrumah’s baby’ (Daily Graphic, 1962). Yet this also led to grievances with the project being tied to Nkrumah. Eventually he was overthrown in a military coup in 1966 due to a ‘lack of democratic practices’; arguably the Akosombo Dam could be a symbol of these.

Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana 1957-1966

International Politics

The Volta River Project also features as an international political conflict of interest. Bediako Poku, a Ghanaian politician at the time described the project as ‘economic enslavement’ (Miescher, 2014). and highlighted the neo-colonialism of the project. For example, whilst the Ghanaian government paid for 50% of the cost the country was only allocated 20% of the power generated; the other 80% went to VALCO, the US-owned company operating the dam (Okoampa-Aboofe, 2008). Poku further called for an ‘economic africanisation’ (Miescher, 2014), training African technicians and accountants to be employed in the scheme. This example highlights Ghana’s dream of uniting a colonised and divided African continent, but the actuality of continued western power over Africa. This is particularly pertinent as ‘Nkrumah’s Baby’ was in reality not the symbol of independence it promised to be, rather a project profiting US business. Clearly the Akosombo Dam was a project not shaped by idealism, or water management priorities but powerful global actors.

 List of References

Cool Geography (2014) Development in Ghana. Available at: http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/9/Development/Ghana/ghana.jpg (Accessed: 22 November 2016). 

Daily Graphic (1962) - The Co-Operator 1, no. 20, Feb 1962; 27 March 1962, pp. 6–7. DG

GhanaWeb (1994) History of Akosombo dam. Available at: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/history/akosombo_dam.php (Accessed: 22 November 2016). 

Miescher, S.F. (2014) ‘“Nkrumah’s Baby”: The Akosombo dam and the dream of development in Ghana, 1952–1966’, Water History, 6(4), pp. 341–366. 

Nkrumah K (1997 [1963]) The Volta River Project: national assembly, 25 March 1963. In: Obeng S (compiler) selected speeches: Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 5. Afram Publications, Accra, pp 20–24 

Okoampa-Ahoofe, K. (2008) NPP cuts sod for Bui dam. Available at: https://www.modernghana.com/news/141837/npp-cuts-sod-for-bui-dam.html (Accessed: 22 November 2016).