Conflict or Cooperation - Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley Part 2

My last post focused on the Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley up until the 1959 Nile Waters Treaty. Following on from this, I will explore contemporary emerging conflicts such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin Initiative.

Nile Basin Initiative

The Nile Basin Initiative was launched in Feburary 1999 to coordinate Nile riparian states, develop the river in a cooperative manner and ensure socioeconomic benefits were shared (Nile Basin Initiative, 2016). The initiative has been particularly successful in its ‘Shared Vision Program’ to build institutions to share data, information and provide training around monitoring the River (ibid). According to the NBI, the Nile Basin saw observable improvements in the extent and quality of cooperation amongst riparians (ibid). However from the outset it was a transitional mechanism into the ‘Cooperative Framework Agreement’ that aimed to improve the equality of water allocations within the basin. Furthermore I will now analyse the present day issues within the Nile highlighting that perhaps the NBI wasn’t as successful as it originally appeared.

Cooperative Framework Agreement

The Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is set upon a backdrop of increasing development amongst east African nations such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Launched in 2010, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi have all signed the CFA, which states that they want experts to decide allocations of water in the Nile. Upper riparians expressed that they are ‘tired of first getting permission from Egypt before using the Nile’; a caveat placed on them in the 1929 Nile Waters agreement (Magga, 2010). These nations are beginning to experience periods of economic growth and development e.g. 2016 economic growth levels of 6.5% in Rwanda and 7% in Tanzania and thus water access is essential for industrial and agricultural development.

Current water allocations are clearly unfair with Egypt and Sudan enjoying 90% of the Nile’s water resource, despite Ethiopia’s tributaries contributing over 80% of the water (Nile Basin Initiative, 2016). However both Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CFA claiming they wanted to know their exact allocations of water, Egypt’s rhetoric is highly un-cooperational stating ‘Egypt will not sign any agreement that affects its share of water’ (BBC, 2010). The CFA highlights a clear conflict of interest emerging within the Nile Valley and a geopolitical shift into categories of upstream vs. downstream riparians. Salman (2013) forwards the notion that upstream states are ‘challenging the legal and political hegemony of Egypt and Sudan’ corroborating this view of renewed power balances in the region.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

A model of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

A clear exemplification of the changing geopolitical situation within the Nile Basin is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The dam is expected to open in 2017, improving hydropower and food security within Ethiopia (Nasr and Neef, 2016). The language utilised is important here, with  ‘Renaissance’ meaning a ‘revival of interest’, perhaps a renewed interest in Ethiopia’s geopolitical strength in the region, or access to resources. The conflict created by the GERD also highlights Egypt’s desire to further its ‘hydro-hegemony’ (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) over the region. Egypt strongly opposes the dam and subsequently wants to increase its share of the Nile from 66% to 90% (All Africa, 2012). Even Sudan, Egypt’s usual ally, has criticised them of ‘inflaming the situation’ (ibid). The GERD is backed by investment from a myriad of foreign investors including China, Italy and Norway, which further challenges Egyptian hegemony within the region and shifts the balance of power towards Ethiopia and other upstream riparians. The NBI, CFA and construction of the GERD all demonstrate that power and trust are in a constant state of re-negotiation and transboundary water agreements are no real measure of cooperative relations between states (Nasr and Neef, 2016).

Conclusions

It is clear that the geographies of power within the Nile Basin are constantly being re-negotiated, both through official agreements and through rising tensions. There is a real threat that a split between upstream vs. downstream riparians could hamper further efforts for water cooperation and could trigger conflicts (BBC, 2010). Whilst Egypt plays its historical character by attempting to instil hydro-hegemony upon the region, Chinese investment and CFA alliances amongst increasing wealthy east African countries are challenging this ‘era of monopoly’ in the Nile Basin (Nasr and Neef, 2016). However I feel that focusing on these issues through an international geopolitical lens can often abstract us from on the ground realities. For example changing riparian allocations may leave Egyptian citizens without jobs and water or food scarce, yet keeping the status quo may hinder efforts to bring millions of east Africans out of poverty. Clearly there are no easy answers in the game of Hydropolitics, however as Salman highlights, the evening power differentials between upstream and downstream riparians will hopefully highlight the necessity of cooperation (Salman, 2013).

List of References

All Africa (2012) Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201402191185.html (Accessed: 24 November 2016)  

BBC (2010) BBC news - east Africa seeks more Nile water from Egypt. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Hala Nasr and Andreas Neef (2016) Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Geopolitics, 21:4, 969-989

Magga, G. (2010) Uganda: Ethiopian led river Nile agreement signed without Egypt and Sudan - Afrik-news.Com: Africa news, Maghreb news - the african daily newspaper. Available at: http://www.afriknews.com/article17639.html (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Nile Basin Initiative (2016) Nile Basin Initiative. Available at: http://www.nilebasin.org (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Salman, M.A. (2013) ‘The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement: A peacefully unfolding African spring?’, Water International, 38(1), pp. 17–29.

The World Bank (2016b) Economy & growth. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-growth (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Zeitoun, M. and Warner, J. (2006) ‘Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy, 8(5), p. 435.