War of the Roses - Investigating the water and politics of the Kenyan cut flower industry

Lake Naivasha is a lake in the south-west of Kenya, close to Nairobi, and is home to Kenya’s booming cut-flower business. The industry has grown hugely in the last 40 years and now makes up 7% of Kenya’s exports, providing jobs for 25,000 employees (Mekonnen et al, 2012). However the rapid increase in both large-scale flower production and the resultant population increase have created significant water management issues in the area. Lake levels have declined, water quality deteriorated and biodiversity is threatened; the lake has shrunk to 75% of its original size since 1982 (Vidal, 2007).

Greenhouses for flower farms on Lake Naivasha, Kenya.

Issues Created

The growth in cut-flower production has prompted greater water use in the Lake Naivasha area; around 20,000 cubic metres of water per day (Vidal, 2007). In particular, non-accredited farms use large amounts of water and it has been suggested that there is the potential of losing the lake within 10-15 years if current water use trends continue (Leipold and Morgante, 2013). In addition the booming flower industry has led to an increase in population around the lake of 300,000 people in the last 30 years (Vidal, 2007). Thus significant threats to the local ecosystem have ensued such as land degradation due to excess farming, deforestation for firewood and soil erosion. In addition, the increase in flower farms has restricted access for nomadic Massai tribes to provide for their cattle, concurrently demand for meat is increasing leading to further need for cattle feed and land degradation. Thus a vicious cycle is created by increase demands for water and food alongside decreased capabilities to meet them. In addition to this the biodiversity around the lake has been harmed seeing a decline in fishing industry as Naivasha become polluted with harmful pesticides and chemicals.

Lake Naivasha is famed as a wetlands area and historically had a great tourism trade, however as bird populations are affected by the cut flower industry, so bird watching is in ‘terminal decline’ creating revenue losses for the local area (Food and Water Watch, 2006). Furthermore unregulated farms are being set up on protected wetland habitats (Leipold and Morgante, 2013), further endangering the biodiversity and natural beauty of this area.

The issues faced in Lake Naivasha highlight the integrated nature of water and ecosystems; nature clearly lies in a balance that has been hugely disturbed by large-scale, intrusive cut-flower farming operations.

Benefits?

However, whilst it is easy to focus on criticising the cut flower industry, it provides vital employment and income for Kenya, a country on the cusp of economic development. The industry employs 25,000 farmers around Lake Naivasha with around 175,000 more indirectly employed. Furthermore some companies provide free medical services and schools helping to improve social development in the local area (Mekonnen et al, 2012). Although there are reports that private medical services provided by companies aim to hide the diseases caused by chemicals to employees (Leipold and Morgante, 2013).

The cut flower industry at Lake Naivasha also generates a debate around ‘fair trade’, it is argued that many companies accredited with fair trade are engaging in unethical practices. Many companies that claim to be ‘fair trade’ are paying workers too low, polluting water with pesticides or other detrimental practices (ARB, 2007). Companies such as Oserian have been cited to engage in unfair fair-trade, advertising their flowers in consumer markets as ‘fairly grown’ and ‘environmentally sustainable’ despite being not so. Thus this highlights that Lake Naivasha isn’t just an issue of water management but also one of rights, fairness and global representations of trade.

The solution?

Now that I’ve highlighted a whole host of issues created by the cut-flower industry around Lake Naivasha, its pertinent to consider the best way to minimise the impacts on the water system and environment.

One method that has been successful is accreditation of farms and the utilisation of local watchdog bodies. Industry accreditation bodies provide certification to arms that engage in responsible farming practices such as using less water or less pesticides. This transfers to the consumer-side in which it is expected that buyers of flowers will prefer to buy from approved and accredited growing companies (Leipold and Morgante, 2013). Furthermore by instilling good practice in accredited farms, it is hoped that these practices will spill-over to become industry norms amongst all farms. Watchdog bodies also assist in reducing the environmental impact of the business, such as the Lake Naivasha Riparian Association, which aims to regulate water used by each farm (Leipold and Morgante, 2013) and create fair and responsible allocations of water. In addition accreditation agencies such as fair trade labelling encourage the preservation of natural habitats by planting trees etc. and thus limit the destruction of biodiversity.

An idea that can be used alongside accreditation is adding a water sustainability premium at the retail end of the supply chains. Increasing the cost of cut flowers to buy for example in the UK will add a ‘sustainability premium’ ensuring that consumers pay a price that coverts the full environmental cost of production (Mekonnen et al, (2012). Whilst it may be presumed that this will reduce demand for flowers, the ethical consumption market is growing in the global north and accreditation agencies such as fair trade can tap into this by educating consumers and providing finances to reduce the ecological footprint of cut flowers.

NGO’s investigations and reports into the issue of cut flowers in the Lake Naivasha area have been vital in uncovering environmental and issues such as overuse of water, pollution of the lake such as the Ethical Trading Initative’s 2005 report.

However there are fears that stricter rules for cut-flower farms could lead to a movement of firms to neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia. Five major flower companies have already moved there following incentives such as 10 year tax holidays and duty-free import of capital goods (ARB, 2007). Thus it begs the question, will Kenya prioritise its economic development or its environment, or can it strike a balance of the two? The current trends are certainly not sustainable and thus it is in the interests of flower companies to improve their relationship with the environment and reduce their water usage.

Roses being sold

List of references

ARB (2007) Flowers: Kenya. Af Res Bull 43(11):17197A–17198A

Becht R, Harper DM (2002) Towards an understanding of human impact upon the hydrology of Lake Naivasha, Kenya. Hydrobiologia 488:1–11

Food and Water Watch (2006) Lake Naivasha Report. Available at: http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/NaivashaReport.pdf (Accessed: 26 November 2016).

Leipold, B. and Morgante, F. (2013) ‘International public policy review the impact of the flower industry on Kenya’s sustainable development’, International Public Policy Review, 7(2).

Mekonnen, M.M., Hoekstra, A.Y. and Becht, R. (2012) ‘Mitigating the water footprint of export cut flowers from the lake Naivasha basin, Kenya’, Water Resources Management, 26(13), pp. 3725–3742 .

Vidal, J. (2007) Drained of life. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/feb/14/kenya.conservation (Accessed: 26 November 2016).

The Akosombo Dam as a Political Symbol

‘The Akosombo Dam across the Volta River in Ghana remains at the center of debates and imaginations about nationhood, modernity, and development’ (Miescher, 2014)

There are a myriad of complex reasons behind the construction of water management systems and this blog post will focus on the utilisation of Dams as a political statement. I will explore the Akosombo Dam in Ghana and the political symbolisms and personality politics involved with its creation.

Background and context

The plans for the Akosombo Dam were formulated in 1915 during British colonial rule, however financing issues meant it wasn’t until Ghana’s Independence that the project began (Miescher, 2014). It was eventually opened in 1965 providing 912 megawatts of power to Ghana, 80% of which went to US–owned Volta Aluminium Company for Aluminium smelting (GhanaWeb, 1994). With Ghana gaining independence in 1957, the Akosombo Dam is central to post-colonial era politics and Kwame Nkrumah’s, the then president, dream of a united Africa. Thus the Akosombo Dam represents power in dual senses of the world; Nkrumah’s power to consolidate his presidency and Ghana’s success, as well as electrical power needed to develop industry within Ghana. This article will discuss the politics and motivations behind the construction of the dam, both domestic and international, set in the context of post-colonialism and African aspirations.

 

Map of Ghana highlighting the Akosombo Dam and subsequent creation of Lake Volta
(Cool Geography, 2014)

Domestic Politics

The ‘Volta River Project straddles the colonial and postcolonial divide’ (Miescher, 2014).  and was poignant in the establishment of Ghana as a postcolonial, independent nation. The era of the 1950’s and 60’s saw the rise of modernisation theory discourse; the view that ‘traditional’ countries can develop following a western model of industrialisation for example Rostow’s Model of growth. Thus, the Akosombo dam was viewed as critically important in Ghana’s industrial development, providing power for industries such as aluminium smelting and manufacturing (Miescher, 2014). Furthermore the Volta River Project held great symbolism as a ‘place of pilgrimage in a modern age of science and technology’ and a ‘monument to the determination to reach a fuller and richer life’ (Nkrumah, 1963). Thus developmentalist discourse of this era, combined with Ghana’s aspirations to be self-sufficient and independent, emphasize the significance of the Akosombo Dam not just as a pathway to industrialisation but also as a symbol of Ghana’s independence and modernity.

The Akosombo Dam also signifies the importance of personality politics within water management schemes. The building of the dam was central to Nkrumah’s dream of creating a modern and unified Africa built on industrialisation leading to the dam being colloquially known as ‘Nkrumah’s baby’ (Daily Graphic, 1962). Yet this also led to grievances with the project being tied to Nkrumah. Eventually he was overthrown in a military coup in 1966 due to a ‘lack of democratic practices’; arguably the Akosombo Dam could be a symbol of these.

Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana 1957-1966

International Politics

The Volta River Project also features as an international political conflict of interest. Bediako Poku, a Ghanaian politician at the time described the project as ‘economic enslavement’ (Miescher, 2014). and highlighted the neo-colonialism of the project. For example, whilst the Ghanaian government paid for 50% of the cost the country was only allocated 20% of the power generated; the other 80% went to VALCO, the US-owned company operating the dam (Okoampa-Aboofe, 2008). Poku further called for an ‘economic africanisation’ (Miescher, 2014), training African technicians and accountants to be employed in the scheme. This example highlights Ghana’s dream of uniting a colonised and divided African continent, but the actuality of continued western power over Africa. This is particularly pertinent as ‘Nkrumah’s Baby’ was in reality not the symbol of independence it promised to be, rather a project profiting US business. Clearly the Akosombo Dam was a project not shaped by idealism, or water management priorities but powerful global actors.

 List of References

Cool Geography (2014) Development in Ghana. Available at: http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/9/Development/Ghana/ghana.jpg (Accessed: 22 November 2016). 

Daily Graphic (1962) - The Co-Operator 1, no. 20, Feb 1962; 27 March 1962, pp. 6–7. DG

GhanaWeb (1994) History of Akosombo dam. Available at: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/history/akosombo_dam.php (Accessed: 22 November 2016). 

Miescher, S.F. (2014) ‘“Nkrumah’s Baby”: The Akosombo dam and the dream of development in Ghana, 1952–1966’, Water History, 6(4), pp. 341–366. 

Nkrumah K (1997 [1963]) The Volta River Project: national assembly, 25 March 1963. In: Obeng S (compiler) selected speeches: Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 5. Afram Publications, Accra, pp 20–24 

Okoampa-Ahoofe, K. (2008) NPP cuts sod for Bui dam. Available at: https://www.modernghana.com/news/141837/npp-cuts-sod-for-bui-dam.html (Accessed: 22 November 2016).

Conflict or Cooperation - Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley Part 2

My last post focused on the Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley up until the 1959 Nile Waters Treaty. Following on from this, I will explore contemporary emerging conflicts such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin Initiative.

Nile Basin Initiative

The Nile Basin Initiative was launched in Feburary 1999 to coordinate Nile riparian states, develop the river in a cooperative manner and ensure socioeconomic benefits were shared (Nile Basin Initiative, 2016). The initiative has been particularly successful in its ‘Shared Vision Program’ to build institutions to share data, information and provide training around monitoring the River (ibid). According to the NBI, the Nile Basin saw observable improvements in the extent and quality of cooperation amongst riparians (ibid). However from the outset it was a transitional mechanism into the ‘Cooperative Framework Agreement’ that aimed to improve the equality of water allocations within the basin. Furthermore I will now analyse the present day issues within the Nile highlighting that perhaps the NBI wasn’t as successful as it originally appeared.

Cooperative Framework Agreement

The Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is set upon a backdrop of increasing development amongst east African nations such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Launched in 2010, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi have all signed the CFA, which states that they want experts to decide allocations of water in the Nile. Upper riparians expressed that they are ‘tired of first getting permission from Egypt before using the Nile’; a caveat placed on them in the 1929 Nile Waters agreement (Magga, 2010). These nations are beginning to experience periods of economic growth and development e.g. 2016 economic growth levels of 6.5% in Rwanda and 7% in Tanzania and thus water access is essential for industrial and agricultural development.

Current water allocations are clearly unfair with Egypt and Sudan enjoying 90% of the Nile’s water resource, despite Ethiopia’s tributaries contributing over 80% of the water (Nile Basin Initiative, 2016). However both Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CFA claiming they wanted to know their exact allocations of water, Egypt’s rhetoric is highly un-cooperational stating ‘Egypt will not sign any agreement that affects its share of water’ (BBC, 2010). The CFA highlights a clear conflict of interest emerging within the Nile Valley and a geopolitical shift into categories of upstream vs. downstream riparians. Salman (2013) forwards the notion that upstream states are ‘challenging the legal and political hegemony of Egypt and Sudan’ corroborating this view of renewed power balances in the region.

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

A model of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

A clear exemplification of the changing geopolitical situation within the Nile Basin is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The dam is expected to open in 2017, improving hydropower and food security within Ethiopia (Nasr and Neef, 2016). The language utilised is important here, with  ‘Renaissance’ meaning a ‘revival of interest’, perhaps a renewed interest in Ethiopia’s geopolitical strength in the region, or access to resources. The conflict created by the GERD also highlights Egypt’s desire to further its ‘hydro-hegemony’ (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) over the region. Egypt strongly opposes the dam and subsequently wants to increase its share of the Nile from 66% to 90% (All Africa, 2012). Even Sudan, Egypt’s usual ally, has criticised them of ‘inflaming the situation’ (ibid). The GERD is backed by investment from a myriad of foreign investors including China, Italy and Norway, which further challenges Egyptian hegemony within the region and shifts the balance of power towards Ethiopia and other upstream riparians. The NBI, CFA and construction of the GERD all demonstrate that power and trust are in a constant state of re-negotiation and transboundary water agreements are no real measure of cooperative relations between states (Nasr and Neef, 2016).

Conclusions

It is clear that the geographies of power within the Nile Basin are constantly being re-negotiated, both through official agreements and through rising tensions. There is a real threat that a split between upstream vs. downstream riparians could hamper further efforts for water cooperation and could trigger conflicts (BBC, 2010). Whilst Egypt plays its historical character by attempting to instil hydro-hegemony upon the region, Chinese investment and CFA alliances amongst increasing wealthy east African countries are challenging this ‘era of monopoly’ in the Nile Basin (Nasr and Neef, 2016). However I feel that focusing on these issues through an international geopolitical lens can often abstract us from on the ground realities. For example changing riparian allocations may leave Egyptian citizens without jobs and water or food scarce, yet keeping the status quo may hinder efforts to bring millions of east Africans out of poverty. Clearly there are no easy answers in the game of Hydropolitics, however as Salman highlights, the evening power differentials between upstream and downstream riparians will hopefully highlight the necessity of cooperation (Salman, 2013).

List of References

All Africa (2012) Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201402191185.html (Accessed: 24 November 2016)  

BBC (2010) BBC news - east Africa seeks more Nile water from Egypt. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Hala Nasr and Andreas Neef (2016) Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Geopolitics, 21:4, 969-989

Magga, G. (2010) Uganda: Ethiopian led river Nile agreement signed without Egypt and Sudan - Afrik-news.Com: Africa news, Maghreb news - the african daily newspaper. Available at: http://www.afriknews.com/article17639.html (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Nile Basin Initiative (2016) Nile Basin Initiative. Available at: http://www.nilebasin.org (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Salman, M.A. (2013) ‘The Nile basin cooperative framework agreement: A peacefully unfolding African spring?’, Water International, 38(1), pp. 17–29.

The World Bank (2016b) Economy & growth. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-growth (Accessed: 24 November 2016).

Zeitoun, M. and Warner, J. (2006) ‘Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts’, Water Policy, 8(5), p. 435.